13th March 2024
What Russia’s momentum in Ukraine means for the war in 2024
Russia is gaining momentum in its assault on Ukraine amid stalled Western aid, making the coming months critical to the direction of conflict. In a worst-case scenario, parts of Kyiv’s front line could be at risk of collapse.
在西方援助停滞不前的情况下，俄罗斯对乌克兰的进攻势头越来越猛，这使得未来几个月对冲突的走向至关重要。在最坏的情况下，基辅前线的部分地区可能面临崩溃的风险。
英国军事专家本·巴里的这篇博客原文于2024年3月12日首次发表在《军事平衡+》上。
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俄罗斯成功占领阿夫迪耶夫卡市，以及此后的领土收益，引发了一个问题，即乌克兰在2023年末对2024年战争将陷入僵局的评估是否乐观。
Russia’s success in taking the city of Avdiivka, along with its territorial gains since, raises the question of whether the Ukrainian assessment in late 2023 that the war would stalemate in 2024 may have been optimistic.
面对高伤亡数字，莫斯科愿意夺取领土，再加上炮弹产量的增加，这与西方向基辅缺乏持续的火炮弹药形成了鲜明对比。随着俄罗斯全面入侵的第三年战斗的开始，这些动态为陆地战役的势头最近的转变创造了条件。
Moscow’s willingness to take territory in the face of high casualty figures, coupled with a boost in output of artillery shells, is in contrast with a lack of sustained Western supply of artillery ammunition to Kyiv. Those dynamics have created the conditions for the most recent shift in the land-campaign’s momentum as the third year of fighting in Russia’s full-scale invasion sets in.
在新阶段到来之前，双方都经历了充满挑战的一年，在这一年里，他们都在努力发动成功的进攻。进攻行动取得的领土收益有限，伤亡惨重。俄罗斯和乌克兰都发现突破行动很困难，因为防御阵地防御严密，炮火、地雷和游荡弹药减缓了行动速度。这些斗争暴露了训练和领导能力的不足，这限制了双方进攻行动的战术有效性，同时也展示了协调阵地防御的技巧。
The new phase comes after a challenging year for both sides in which they struggled to mount successful attacks. Offensive operations achieved limited territorial gains and incurred significant casualties. Russia and Ukraine have both found breaching operations difficult, hindered by well-fortified defensive positions and slowed by artillery fire, land mines and loitering munitions. The struggles have exposed training and leadership deficits which have limited the tactical effectiveness of offensive operations on both sides, while showing skill in orchestrating positional defences.
Russian campaign 俄罗斯的战役
长达数月的阿夫迪伊耶卡战役可能为俄罗斯2024年的地面战役定下基调。对莫斯科来说，赢得对这座城市的控制权是其控制顿涅茨克州和卢甘斯克州并以实际领土控制巩固其非法、口头吞并领土的野心的关键所在。俄罗斯似乎也在乌克兰东北部进行同步袭击，以支持这一目标。
The months-long battle for Avdiivka likely sets the tone for Russia’s 2024 ground campaign. For Moscow, winning control of the city is a key piece of the puzzle for its ambition to take control of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and to underpin its illegal, verbal annexation of the territories with actual territorial control. Russia also appears to be undertaking synchronised attacks in northeast Ukraine to support that objective.
俄罗斯的重大伤亡可能意味着，在3月中旬弗拉基米尔·普京总统正式连任之前，莫斯科不会发动重大进攻。在春季和夏季，俄罗斯可能会发动一系列重大袭击，旨在造成乌克兰人伤亡，向西推进防御部队，并扩大对被占领土的控制。
Heavy Russian casualties may mean Moscow will not mount a major offensive until after the pro forma, mid-March re-election of President Vladimir Putin. Over the spring and summer, Russia is likely to mount a series of major attacks designed to inflict Ukrainian casualties, push defenders westward and expand its control of occupied territories.
伦敦国际战略研究所IISS评估称，俄罗斯可以在一段时间内维持其战役。莫斯科已经能够引进足够的合同兵来维持其部队结构，并且应该能够在两年或两年以上的时间里补充坦克在战场上的损失。它还将经济置于战争环境中，目前军费总额占国家预算的三分之一，约占GDP的7.5%。伊朗和朝鲜提供的火炮弹药、游荡弹药和弹道导弹也改变了对乌克兰的火力平衡。这意味着，在未来一年，俄罗斯可能能够制造足够的导弹和无人机，以维持其最近对乌克兰防空系统的压力，攻击其国防工业，并试图侵蚀乌克兰的民事和军事道德准则。
The IISS assesses that Russia can sustain its campaign for some time. Moscow has been able to bring on enough contract soldiers to sustain its force structure and should be able to replenish tank losses on the battlefield for two or more years. It also has put its economy in a war setting, with total military spending now representing one-third of its national budget and reaching about 7.5% of GDP. Supply of artillery ammunition, loitering munitions and ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea also shifts the balance of firepower against Ukraine. That means that over the coming year Russia will probably be able to generate sufficient missiles and drones to maintain its recent level of pressure on Ukraine’s air defences, attack its defence industry and attempt to erode Ukrainian civilian and military moral.
Ukrainian positioning乌克兰的定位
在陆地上，乌克兰已转向战略防御，着眼于保持兵力水平。总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基上个月在慕尼黑安全会议上表示，阿夫迪耶夫卡撤军旨在保护士兵的生命。基辅表示，它正在加强防线，这可能促使它决定也从阿夫迪耶夫卡周围难以防御的村庄撤退，这些村庄很快落入俄罗斯军队手中。
On the ground, Ukraine has moved to the strategic defensive with an eye on preserving troop levels. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at the Munich Security Conference last month that the Avdiivka withdrawal was aimed at preserving soldiers’ lives. Kyiv has indicated it is fortifying defensive lines, which likely drove a decision to also retreat from hard-to-defend villages around Avdiivka that quickly fell to Russian forces.
这种防御重点出现之际，乌克兰正面临着艰难的选择，因为西方没有提供基辅要求获得决定性优势的先进武器。这些要求包括增强电子战能力、更多的监视和攻击无人驾驶飞行器、更好的扫雷工具和F-16战斗机（尽管目前正在进行这些方面的训练）。然而，在这些设备和更多的火炮弹药到达之前，乌克兰军队面临的困境是选择前沿防御态势，以牺牲更高的伤亡为代价阻止俄罗斯军队进入城镇，还是撤退以保护部队。
This defensive focus comes at a time when Ukraine has faced difficult choices absent the Western delivery of advanced weapons that Kyiv asked for to gain a decisive advantage. Those requests included enhanced electronic-warfare capabilities, more surveillance and attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), better mine-breaching tools and F-16 combat aircraft (though training on those is now underway). Until such equipment and more artillery ammunition arrives, though, the dilemma for Ukraine’s army is choosing between a forward-defence posture to keep Russian forces from cities and towns at the cost of higher casualties, or pulling back to conserve troops.
乌克兰的另一个人力考虑因素是，据报道，前线步兵的平均年龄约为43岁。前乌克兰武装部队司令扎卢日内在被替换之前，曾要求基辅为军队再动员50万名新兵。请求被拒绝。虽然很难在不损害经济的情况下一次性调动这样的人数，但目前维持部队人数的方式看起来越来越站不住脚。
Another manpower consideration for Ukraine is the that the average age of front-line infantry soldiers is widely reported as being around 43 years. Former Ukrainian armed forces command Valerii Zaluzhnyi, before being replaced, had asked Kyiv to mobilise 500,000 more recruits for the army. The request was declined. While it would have been difficult to mobilise such numbers in one wave without damaging the economy, the current way of sustaining troop numbers looks increasingly untenable.
随着乌克兰在2023年的反攻基本上失败后重新部署地面部队，以及俄罗斯最近的进展，该国正在加倍实施纵深作战战略，无人机袭击远至莫斯科、圣彼得堡和俄罗斯中部的下诺夫哥罗德地区，距离乌克兰约1000公里。
With Ukraine resetting its ground forces in the aftermath of its largely unsuccessful counter-offensive of 2023 and recent Russian advances, the country is doubling down on its deep battle strategy, with UAV attacks as far afield as Moscow, St Petersburg and the Nizhny Novgorod region in central Russia, some 1,000 kilometres from Ukraine.
Reality bites 现实片段
未来几个月对冲突方向的影响将比2024年僵局情景所暗示的更为关键。
The coming months are shaping up to be more critical to the direction of conflict than the 2024 stalemate scenario suggested.
除非西方将对基辅的援助恢复到以前提供的水平，包括为乌克兰提供足够的火炮，以实现其在去年反攻最激烈时的优势，否则俄罗斯将保留战场主动权。在最坏的情况下，这可能意味着乌克兰将遭遇一系列战术失败，可能导致其部分前线崩溃。
Unless the West restores aid to Kyiv to previously provided levels, including sufficient artillery for Ukraine to achieve the superiority it enjoyed at the height of last year’s counter-offensive, Russia will retain the battlefield initiative. That could spell, in the worst-case scenario, a series of tactical defeats for Ukraine that could lead to a collapse of parts of its front line.
目前，美国在乔·拜登总统领导下向乌克兰提供另一项有意义的军事援助计划的努力仍受到众议院共和党人的阻挠。与此同时，欧洲尚未表现出迅速解决乌克兰紧急需求的工业能力或政治意愿，尽管一些军事援助工作正在进行中。尽管英国已承诺供应“数千”架新型远程攻击无人机，但它们何时抵达仍不确定。
For now, US efforts under President Joe Biden to provide Ukraine with another meaningful military-aid package remain blocked by House Republicans. Europe, meanwhile, has not demonstrated the industrial capacity or political will to quickly address Ukraine’s urgent needs, although several military-assistance efforts are in the works. While the United Kingdom has pledged to supply ‘thousands’ of new, long-range attack UAVs, when they may arrive remains uncertain.
随着冲突在2024年的演变，一个关键因素很可能是俄罗斯的消耗战术与乌克兰通过先进的西方技术获得不对称优势的努力之间的较量，前提是这一点能在足够的时间和数量内实现。如果发生这种情况，战争势头可能会再次摇摆，基辅将从中受益。但就目前而言，这场陆地战争看起来很血腥，有利于莫斯科。
As the conflict evolves throughout 2024, a key element could well be a contest between Russian attritional tactics and efforts by Ukraine to gain an asymmetric advantage through advanced Western technology, providing this arrives in sufficient time and volume. If that happens, the war momentum could swing again, benefitting Kyiv. But for now, the land war looks bloody and favours Moscow.
作者信息：Ben Barry，Senior Fellow for Land Warfare
Ben analyses the higher management of defence, military strategy, operations and tactics, military innovation and adaptation, modern warfare and land warfare.
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